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‘Scotland in the United Kingdom: An enduring settlement’? 
Alan Page, Professor of Public Law, University of Dundee, United Kingdom 
(a.c.page@dundee.ac.uk) 
Abstract 
The Scotland Act 2016 makes extensive changes to the Scottish devolution settlement in 
implementation of the Vow made by the leaders the three main political parties at 
Westminster in the final days of the referendum campaign. This chapter outlines the principal 
changes made to the settlement by the new Scotland Act and asks whether it provides the 
basis for an enduring settlement between Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom. The 
Scottish constitutional debate has been largely about ‘self-rule’ rather than ‘shared rule’: the 
acquisition by Scotland of control over its ‘own affairs’ rather than Scotland’s ‘voice’ in 
relation to ‘reserved matters’, i.e. those matters which continue to be dealt with at the UK 
level of government. The model on which the original devolution settlement was based was 
one of dual rather than cooperative federalism in which decisions in relation to reserved 
matters would continue to be taken in much the same way as before. Intergovernmental 
relations provide one means by which the devolved administrations may seek to influence 
reserved matters, but ‘intergovernmental relations in the UK remain weakly institutionalized 
and more ad hoc than is the case in more established federal political systems, and provide 
only limited opportunities to participate in UK decision-making’. The revised settlement will 
put a premium on cooperation between the two levels of government, particularly in the field 
of welfare. Whether that will materialise, and with it, a different - more cooperative, less 
centre-dominated - mind set at the heart of government remains to be seen.  On that, 
however, the success of the revised settlement may well depend.  
Keywords 
Devolution, federalism, self-rule, shared rule, intergovernmental relations 
Introduction  
The second ways of federalism conference invites reflections on the success of federal 
systems in addressing and re-directing secessionist claims, especially in plurinational 
societies in which political forces with significant support seek to establish an independent 
state. Leaving aside the question of whether the United Kingdom qualifies as a ‘federal 
system’, as we are instructed to do, such an exercise is of obvious relevance to the United 
Kingdom where the prospect of Scottish secession has not disappeared following the 2014 
independence referendum, despite a seemingly clear majority for Scotland remaining part of 
the United Kingdom, and may well come to the fore again following this summer’s EU 
referendum. In the meantime, the Scottish Parliament is set to become ‘one of the most 
powerful devolved parliaments in the world’ (HM Government 2015) as a result of the 
Scotland Act 2016, which was enacted in implementation of the Vow made by the leaders of 
the three main political parties at Westminster in the final days of the referendum campaign. 
In this chapter we examine the changes made to the Scottish devolution settlement by the 
new Scotland Act and ask whether it provides the basis for an ‘enduring settlement’ between 
Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom.  
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Devolution not federalism 
 
The roots of the UK’s ‘federal system’ are traceable to the report of the Royal Commission 
on the Constitution (the Kilbrandon Commission), which was set up in 1969 in response to 
the  growth in electoral support for nationalist parties in Scotland and Wales to ‘investigate 
the case for transferring or devolving responsibility for the exercise of government functions 
from Parliament and the central government to new institution of government in the various 
countries and regions of the United Kingdom’ (Kilbrandon Commission: para 13). 
 
Having identified ‘centralisation’ as a major but not the only cause of dissatisfaction with 
government, the Royal Commission identified three means by which powers could be 
transferred to a country or region: ‘separatism’, which would involve the transfer of 
sovereignty in all matters, in effect creating an independent state; federalism, which would 
see sovereignty divided with sovereignty in certain matters (e.g. education, health) being 
transferred and sovereignty in other matters (e.g. defence, foreign affairs) retained; and 
devolution in which sovereignty would be retained in all matters with the exercise of selected 
powers being  ‘delegated’ to the regions (Kilbrandon Commission: para 423).  
 
The Royal Commission had little hesitation in rejecting independence: ‘For separation to 
succeed it must command the general support of the people concerned. … In our judgment 
the necessary political will for separation does not exist. The vast majority of people simply 
do not want it to happen’ (Kilbrandon Commission: para 497). 
 
As between federalism and devolution, the Royal Commission thought were particular 
reasons for not introducing federalism into the United Kingdom. It saw federalism as a 
‘legalistic system intended for a much earlier stage of constitutional development’, which 
would require ‘a written constitution, a special procedure for changing it and a constitutional 
court to interpret it. None of these features has been present in our constitutional 
arrangements before, and we doubt very much whether they would now find general 
acceptance’ (Kilbrandon Commission: para 527). A federation consisting of four units – 
England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland – would be so unbalanced to be unworkable. 
It would be dominated by the overwhelming political importance and wealth of England 
(which accounts for 84 per cent of the UK’s population). There was no satisfactory way of 
fitting England into a fully federal system (Kilbrandon Commission: para 531), an argument 
which for some commentators continues to be decisive.  
 
But the most fundamental objection, in the Royal Commission’s estimation, was that 
federalism would tend to undermine political and economic unity and make the objectives of 
the United Kingdom more difficult to attain. If government in the United Kingdom was to 
meet the present-day needs of the people, the Commission concluded, it was necessary for 
‘the undivided sovereignty of Parliament to be maintained. We believe that only within the 
general ambit of one supreme elected authority is it likely that there will emerge the degree of 
unity, cooperation and flexibility which common sense suggests is desirable. Even if a federal 
system could be designed to avoid domination by England (and we do not think it could) it 
would endanger the essential unity which now exists and make some important tasks of 
government more difficult to perform. It would probably be regarded by the British people as 
a strange and artificial system not suited to their present stage of constitutional development, 
and in the end would bring the provinces very little more independence than might be 
achieved within a unitary system. In short, the United Kingdom is not an appropriate place 
for federalism and now is not an appropriate time’ (Kilbrandon Commission: para 539).  
 
The devolution settlement 
 
It was to take another 25 years before devolution was introduced in Scotland and Wales, and, 
after a long period in which it had been suspended, re-introduced in Northern Ireland. The 
Scotland Act 1978 made provision for a Scottish Assembly with limited law making powers 
but the scheme was never implemented after it failed to secure the necessary measure of 
popular support in a referendum. The main features of the Scottish devolution settlement 




As the Kilbrandon Commission regarded as essential, the United Kingdom Parliament 
remains sovereign, in theory at least. ‘To sum up’, Lord Sewel, one of the Government 
spokesmen, said in the parliamentary debates on the Scotland Bill, ‘we are setting about a 
devolved settlement - nothing more, nothing less. It is not the first step on the road to some 
other settlement, whether that be independence or federalism. It is a self-contained 
settlement, based on the principles of devolution. Essential to that is the recognition that 
sovereignty remains with the UK Parliament. The UK Parliament retains the ability to 
legislate on all matters, but it devolves the power to legislate, other than on reserved matters, 
to the Scottish parliament’ (HL Debs 21 July 1998, vol 592, col 799 (Lord Sewel)).   
 
This has a number of consequences, the most important of which is that the UK Parliament 
retains the power to legislate in the devolved areas (Scotland Act 1998, s 28(7); the UK 
Government also retains veto powers, which, like the Westminster Parliament’s paramount 
legislative power, were regarded as an essential feature of a non-federal constitution 
(Kilbrandon Commission: para 765)). By convention, however, the UK Parliament does not 
normally legislate in the devolved areas without the Scottish Parliament’s consent. 
Westminster legislation in the devolved areas has proved more common than anticipated at 
the time of devolution, with more than 150 ‘Sewel’ or ‘legislative consent’ motions 
signifying the Scottish Parliament’s consent to Westminster legislation in the devolved areas 
(or altering its legislative competence or the executive competence of the Scottish Ministers). 
The UK Parliament, however, has never legislated in the devolved areas without the Scottish 
Parliament’s consent. 
 
It also means that the institutions of Scottish self-government could in theory be abolished at 
any time, a wholly unlikely possibility but a recurrent source of criticism nonetheless (see 
e.g. Scottish Government 2013: 336). 
 
The division of competences  
 
Rather than listing the matters devolved to the Scottish Parliament at Holyrood, with all other 
matters being reserved to the UK Parliament at Westminster, which was the approach 
adopted by its failed 1978 predecessor, the Scotland Act listed the matters reserved to 
Westminster with all other matters being devolved to Holyrood. Defence and national 
security, macro-economic policy, foreign affairs, immigration, broadcasting, energy, social 
security and pensions, and the constitution were reserved, leaving the ‘majority of domestic 
policy’ devolved, including health, education, justice, local government, housing, planning, 
economic development,, transport, the environment, agriculture and fisheries, sport and the 
arts. The devolution of power, in one observer’s view, was on ‘a prodigious scale. There has 
probably never in any country been a greater voluntary handover of power by any national 




Under the devolution settlement the Scottish Parliament was to be funded mainly by UK 
Treasury block grant. The choice of Treasury block grant rather than taxes as the principal 
means of financing the Parliament’s budget reflected a number of considerations: the 
availability of an already existing mechanism for determining Scotland’s share of UK public 
expenditure in the shape of the population based ‘Barnett formula’; UK Treasury opposition 
to the devolution of tax raising powers; and a concern on the part of Scotland’s political 
representatives to ensure that Scotland continued to receive its ‘fair share’ of UK public 
expenditure. For the Scottish Constitutional Convention, it was essential that Scotland 
continue to be ‘guaranteed her fair share of UK resources, as of right.’ (Scottish 
Constitutional Convention 1995: 27), a concern acknowledged in the devolution White Paper, 
which said that the arrangements for financing  the Scottish Parliament would, among other 
things, ensure that Scotland continued to benefit from its ‘appropriate share of UK public 
expenditure’ (Scottish Office 1997: para 7.2). 
 
That concern with ‘fairness’ - with ensuring that Scotland ‘continued to benefit from its 
appropriate share of UK public expenditure’ (Scottish Office 1997: para 7.2) – is as apparent 
today as it was in the beginning. But it has been supplemented by a much greater emphasis on 
the Scottish Parliament’s financial accountability. In a much quoted lecture in 2003, the 
Parliament’s first Presiding Officer argued that ‘no self-respecting parliament should expect 
to exist permanently on 100% handouts demined by another parliament, nor should it be 
responsible for massive public expenditure without any responsibility for raising revenue in a 
manner accountable to its electorate’ (Lord Steel of Aikwood 2003). 
 
The Commission on Scottish Devolution (the Calman Commission), which was set up by the 
opposition parties in the Scottish Parliament, with the support of the UK Government, in 
response to the 2007 minority SNP government’s ‘National Conversation’ on Scotland’s 
constitutional future (Scottish Government 2007), was accordingly  asked ‘to review the 
provisions of the Scotland Act 1998 in the light of experience and to recommend any changes 
to the present constitutional arrangements that would enable the Scottish Parliament to serve 
the people of Scotland better, improve the financial accountability of the Scottish Parliament, 
and continue to secure the position of Scotland within the United Kingdom.’ In order to 
increase the Scottish Parliament’s financial accountability, the Commission recommended the 
introduction of a Scottish rate of income tax, in partial replacement of UK income tax, and 
the devolution of a number of minor taxes; the Parliament should also be empowered to 
introduce new devolved taxes with the agreement of the UK Parliament (Commission on 
Scottish Devolution 2009). The Commission was confident that its recommendations, once 
implemented, would make clear that the Scottish Parliament was not ‘wholly dependent in 
grant from another Parliament’, and was now responsible for raising ‘a significant proportion 
of its revenue’, estimated a 35 per cent, ‘in a manner accountable to the electorate’ 
(Commission on Scottish Devolution 2009: para 3.208). Its recommendations were given 
effect (with some modifications) by the Scotland Act 2012 in what the accompanying White 
Paper described as ‘the largest transfer of fiscal power from London since the creation of the 
United Kingdom’ (HM Government 2010: 11).  
 
Scotland’s ‘voice at the centre’  
 
The Scottish constitutional debate has been largely about ‘self-rule’ rather than ‘shared rule’: 
the acquisition by Scotland of control over its ‘own affairs’ rather than Scotland’s ‘voice’ in 
relation to ‘reserved matters’, i.e. those matters which continue to be dealt with at the UK 
level of government. The model on which the devolution settlement was based was one of 
dual rather than cooperative federalism in which decisions in relation to reserved matters 
would continue to be taken in much the same way as before. Intergovernmental relations 
provide one means by which the devolved administrations may seek to influence reserved 
matters - territorial representation in the national parliament another - but ‘intergovernmental 
relations in the UK remain weakly institutionalized and more ad hoc than is the case in more 
established federal political systems, and provide only limited opportunities to participate in 
UK decision-making’ (McEwen 2016: 232). The Calman Commission sought a ‘much better 
developed and more robust framework between parliaments and governments … to ensure 
that, where developed and reserved responsibilities overlap or impinge on one another, proper 
coordination and joint working are more fully encouraged and supported, with appropriate 
scrutiny by the parliaments to which the governments are accountable’ (Commission on 
Scottish Devolution 2009: para 4.128), but implementation of its recommendations was 
overtaken by the independence referendum.  
The role of the courts  
 
Finally, the courts have a role in the devolution settlement but it is about ensuring that the 
Scottish Parliament remains within the bounds of its competence rather than guaranteeing a 
division of powers on the federal model. A decision that the Scottish Parliament was acting 
within its legislative competence, however, would make it difficult, in practice, for the 
Westminster Parliament to override it either by legislating for Scotland or by altering the 
distribution of powers (Bogdanor 2009: 115).  
 
The Scotland Act changes 
 
There was only one question on the ballot paper for the independence referendum on 18 
September 2014: ‘Should Scotland be an independent country?’ As part of the negotiations 
between the United Kingdom and Scottish Governments over a referendum that was ‘legal, 
fair and decisive’, the Scottish Government had sought a second question on further powers 
for the Scottish Parliament, but the UK Government was adamant that only once the question 
of Scotland’s future within the United Kingdom had been settled could there be any 
consideration of further devolution. With a UK general election set to take place in May 
2015, the assumption was that work on further powers in the event of a No vote would only 
begin after the UK general election, by which time the countdown to the Scottish Parliament 
elections in May 2016 would already have begun. In the final days of the referendum 
campaign, however, with the polls suddenly narrowing, the leaders of the three main political 
parties at Westminster ‘vowed’ to deliver ‘extensive new powers’ for the Parliament ‘by the 
process and according to the timetable announced by our three parties, starting on 19 
September’ (Daily Record, 16 September 2014), a vow widely regarded, rightly or wrongly, 
as having sealed victory for the No campaign.  
The Smith Commission, a cross-party commission, overseen by Lord Smith of Kelvin, was 
convened immediately after the referendum, with the task of reaching agreement on the 
devolution of further powers to the Scottish Parliament by 30 November 2014. The 
Commission, in which all five political parties in the Scottish Parliament including the SNP 
took part, reached agreement on a package of new powers to be devolved to the Parliament 
(Smith Commission 2014), which was published on 27 November 2014, ten weeks after the 
referendum, confounding the expectations of those who doubted whether any form of 
agreement could be reached in such a short space of time. The UK Government undertook to 
prepare draft legislative proposals to implement the agreement by 25 January 2015, which 
would form the basis of a Scotland Bill to be brought forward by the next UK Government 
following the general election in May 2015. Draft clauses were published on 22 January 2015 
(HM Government 2015), and the Scotland Bill was introduced in the House of Commons on 
28 May 2015, following the Conservative Party’s victory at the UK general election. After 
protracted negotiations over the accompanying ‘fiscal framework’, the Scottish Parliament 
agreed to the Bill’s consideration by Westminster on 16 March 2016, clearing the way for the 
Bill to complete its parliamentary stages and become law on 23 March 2016, less than a year 
after its introduction, and less than two years after the referendum.  
 
The Act makes the following changes to the devolution settlement in implementation of the 
Smith Commission agreement:   
 
The Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government 
 
The Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government are both declared to be ‘a permanent part 
of the United Kingdom’s constitutional arrangements’, to which end they ‘are not to be 
abolished except on the basis of a decision of the people of Scotland voting in a referendum’ 
(Scotland Act 2016 s 1, inserting new s 63A(1) in Scotland Act 1998). There will no doubt be 
those who argue that Westminster retains the power to abolish the Scottish Parliament and the 
Scottish Government without a referendum, but the political reality, which the Act reflects, is 
that the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government are part of the United Kingdom’s 
constitutional arrangements, and will continue to be so for so long as Scotland remains part of 
the United Kingdom.  
 
In the parliamentary proceedings on the Bill, the UK Government insisted that the declaration 
of permanence had no bearing on the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, which remained 
unchanged: ‘It appears to us that, in light of the Smith commission agreement, the 
Government should be prepared to make that political declaration of permanence. It does not 
take away from the supremacy or sovereignty of this United Kingdom Parliament. That 
remains’ (HL Debs 8 December 2015, vol 767, col 1465 (Lord Keen)).  
 
The Sewel convention  
 
The Act also recognizes that the Parliament of the United Kingdom ‘will not normally 
legislate with regard to devolved matters without the consent of the Scottish Parliament’ 
(Scotland Act 2016, s 2, inserting new s 28(8) in Scotland Act 1998). As applied in practice, 
the ‘Sewel convention’ extends to Westminster legislation altering the Scottish Parliament’s 
legislative competence and the executive competence of the Scottish Ministers, as well as 
with regard to devolved matters. Such changes may be made by executive order under the 
Scotland Act (Scotland Act 1998, s 30(2)), in which case the consent of the Scottish 
Parliament is required. Their inclusion within the scope of the convention thus ensures the 
need for the Parliament’s consent regardless of whether they are made by primary or 
secondary legislation. The United Kingdom Government, however, resisted amendments to 
the Scotland Bill which would have reflected the convention’s application in practice, 
possibly with a view to leaving it free to argue that replacement of the Human Rights Act by 
a British Bill of Rights in implementation if its election manifesto commitment would not 
require the Scottish Parliament’s consent under the convention. 
 
The repeal of section 28(7) of the Scotland Act, which affirms the continuing powers of the 
United Kingdom Parliament to make laws for Scotland, was not canvassed during the Smith 
Commission process, but the combined effect of these two provisions is to set the seal on a 
federal or near federal relationship between Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom, in 
which the devolution settlement cannot be amended or legislation enacted with regard to 
devolved matters without the Scottish Parliament’s consent.  
 
Elections, composition and functioning  
 
In a further recognition of its ‘coming of age’, the Scottish Parliament will also assume ‘all 
powers’ in relation to elections to the Scottish Parliament and local government elections in 
Scotland (but not in relation to Westminster or European elections), together with control 
over its composition and functioning. Rather than being amendable by ordinary process of 
legislation, however, Scottish Parliament legislation amending the franchise, the electoral 
system or the number of constituency and regional members for the Scottish Parliament will 
require to be passed by a two-thirds majority of the Scottish Parliament (Scotland Act 2016, s 
11). 
 
Welfare and taxation 
 
The Scottish Parliament’s powers are also increased in the fields of welfare and taxation. As 
regards the former, the state pension remains reserved, as does universal credit, which will 
replace the existing working age benefits when it is fully implemented, but the Scottish 
Ministers will have the power to alter the frequency of universal credit payments, and the 
Scottish Parliament the power to vary the housing cost elements. Outside universal credit, a 
number of individual benefits are devolved, including attendance allowance, carer’s 
allowance, disability living allowance and personal independence payments. The Scottish 
Parliament also acquires the power to create new benefits in areas of devolved responsibility. 
A feature of the Scottish devolution settlement hitherto has been that it has proceeded on the 
basis of a clear distinction between reserved and devolved matters. The Act’s welfare 
provisions, however, create what is effectively a partially shared competence – a ‘shared 
legislative space’ - which will require a much higher degree of cooperation between the two 
governments than has previously been the case (Gallagher 2015). 
 
As regards taxation, the Scottish Parliament will gain the power to set the rates of UK income 
tax and the thresholds at which these are paid for the non-savings and non-dividend income 
of Scottish tax payers. Other taxes (air passenger duty and the aggregates levy) are also 
devolved, and the first ten percentage points of the standard rate of VAT raised in Scotland 
assigned to the Scottish Government’s budget. Once the changes are brought into force, it is 
estimated that the Scottish Parliament will control around 60 per cent of spending in Scotland 
and retain around 40 per cent of Scottish tax receipts, with the difference between income and 
expenditure continuing to be met by UK Treasury block grant. 
 
The fiscal framework  
 
Under the accompanying fiscal framework agreed between the two governments (HM 
Government and the Scottish Government 2016), the block grant will be adjusted to reflect 
the introduction of devolved and assigned revenues and the transfer of responsibility for 
welfare.  Crucially, Scotland will protected against the risk that its population and hence its 
revenues might grow more slowly than those of the rest of the United Kingdom. The 
agreement, however, is only for five years, after which it will be reviewed, with the review 
being informed by an independent report, and the method of adjusting the block grant 




The Smith Commission saw increased powers for the Scottish Parliament as demanding 
strengthened collaboration between the Scottish and UK Governments: ‘The parties believe 
that the current inter-governmental machinery between Scottish and UK Governments, 
including the Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC) structures, must be reformed as a matter of 
urgency and scaled up significantly to reflect the scope of the agreement arrived at by the 
parties’ (Smith Commission 2014: para 28). In a personal recommendation added to the 
report, Lord Smith, the chair of the Commission, urged the two governments to tackle the 
issue of ‘weak intergovernmental working’. The current situation ‘coupled with what will be 
a stronger Scottish Parliament and a more complex devolution settlement means the problem 
needs to be fixed. Both Governments need to work together to create a more productive, 
robust, visible and transparent relationship. There also needs to be greater respect between 
them.’ (Smith Commission 2014: Foreword). At the plenary meeting of the JMC on 15 
December 2014, Ministers agreed to commission work on a revised version of the 
Memorandum of Understanding which governs relations between the UK Government and 
the devolved administrations. At the time of writing, discussions on a revised Memorandum 
of Understanding have still to be concluded. Commentators are in no doubt, however, as to 
the need for a marked strengthening of mechanisms that could facilitate shared rule as well as 
a willingness on the part of both governments to utilize them. What is required is ‘a shift to 
more federal mind-set at the heart of central government, and a commitment to making such a 
system work from all governments concerned’ (McEwen 2016: 240-241).  
 
An enduring settlement? 
 
The literature on federalism tells us that simply increasing self-rule without any attempt to 
generate at the same time a federal focus of loyalty is unlikely to prevent the disintegration of 
a federal system (Watts 2008:182-183). ‘It is clear that more regional autonomy may 
contribute to the accommodation of diversity, but by itself it is unlikely to be sufficient.  It 
needs to be accompanied by the institutional encouragement of common interests that provide 
the glue to hold the federation together. Thus both the elements of “self-rule” for constituent 
units and “shared rule” through common institutions, a combination that characterises federal 
political systems, are essential to their long-run effectiveness in combining unity and 
diversity’ (Watts 2008: 23).  
 
What ‘building in’ as well as ‘building out’ (Simeon 2009: 247-248) might involve in the 
United Kingdom case is a matter for debate. One approach that has attracted some attention 
involves the revision and codification of the UK’s ‘territorial constitution’, understood as the 
distribution of powers and resources across the constituent nations of the United Kingdom.  
‘It is no longer acceptable’, Gallagher argues, ‘for people in Scotland, and indeed Wales and 
Northern Ireland, to see the UK as a complex territorial state, but for many at the centre to 
behave as if it were a unitary state based on an outdated notion of parliamentary sovereignty.’  
If Scotland is to remain in the UK, the UK has to ‘redefine its territorial nature, not just 
settling the details of the constitution for a devolved Scotland in the Scotland Bill, but setting 
out the territorial constitution of the UK as a whole, in a way which respects Scotland’s long 
held status as both separate and part of the UK at the same time’ (Gallagher 2015a; see also 
Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law 2015).  
 
Recent years have seen no lack of proposals for a constitutional convention to settle some or 
all aspects of the UK’s unwritten constitution. The difficulty of reaching any form of 
agreement over the territorial constitution, however, should not be underestimated (Evans 
2015). In particular, there is no obvious incentive for the SNP to subscribe to any agreement 
which might threaten the ultimate prize of independence. ‘To argue for a written constitution 
would seem, at least to the Scots, a barrier rather than an enable of further social and political 
change, something which would lock them into the Union should they decide to leave it’ 
(McCrone 2015). In the meantime, the increasingly complexity of the devolution settlement 
creates a need for enhanced cooperation between the two levels of government. Whether that 
will materialise, and with it a different - more cooperative, less centre-dominated - mind set 
at the heart of government remains to be seen.  On that, however, the success of the revised 
settlement may well depend. 
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